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A degree in mathematics from Oxford, a doctorate in mathematical epidemiology and economics from Cambridge. So I, I did a math degree at Oxford, which is more pure math. You know, pure math can be very theoretical and detached from the real world, and it’s getting worse. What is that? The second is excess returns.
And when I was studying in university economics, I did not really get the passion. Those types of excess savings were sort of the culprit for the conundrum in 2005 or whatever it was. My really first stroke of luck, I think, was getting that job. You may have to get to long-short world to take advantage of those types of opportunities.
It was a wild ride because by the time you got, well, so in 2005, we went on a road show trying to tell people what we had learned, and there wasn’t a lot of reception. And in the 2000 at the 2005 conference, it’s kind of wild. Maybe the market hadn’t priced something properly. Sean Dobson : It was a wild ride.
We, we made in 2005, I believe. That 00:15:42 [Speaker Changed] Was first AI investment, 2005. So here’s the math, Barry. We’re all, I mean, it’s like a Bloomberg Stream, constantly sharing news analysis, politics, economics, company specific venture capital, because we care. Listen to this, Barry.
So as much as I’m personally still a pretty strong skeptic of active management, I mean, I understand the math, and the odds are not in your favor. I read all those academic papers, I understand where the math comes from. It’s how math works. There’s no economic incentive for anybody to change any of that.
This was the era, 2005, 2006, all of my friends were looking to get banking roles. And I, and I really like the application of math and statistics and computer science to markets. You learn the math that can help you with, with market making operations. It’s just not smart on a math basis to do that.
That’s why the markets are much more of a mind game than a math game. And that’s why markets will always be exceedingly hard, even when the math seems easy or the future seems certain. These experts made a living “analyzing” and pontificating on political and economic developments. And lots of surprises.
And this was back in 2005 or 2006. So, it’s not one of these fuzzy math situations where you don’t really know what the value of the fund is because it’s got private companies in it that are being marked by individuals who have an ax to grind in the mark. And these guys don’t like money sitting on a shelf.
Initially, it was started in 2005 and it was called Revolution, but it was just my capital. The math never seems to work out. The interesting thing about this economic development battle where different states are fighting with each other over the same existing companies has sort of zero sum for America. RITHOLTZ: Right.
When I look back at 2005, ’06, ’07, yeah, those growth stocks that collapsed from way too high, probably were too low. RITHOLTZ: Did you see the Liberty Street Economics research paper? SIEGEL: Then it was — you know, I tried to read a couple of things that aren’t just economics. SIEGEL: Yes. RITHOLTZ: Sure.
in Economics from Chicago and MBA from Stanford. So, I did the math, 20 million times a hundred. So, let me just repeat the math. And so, again, I went through this simple math. Even if you read both of Browder’s books, you will find something to be amazed at. With no further ado, my conversation with Bill Browder.
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